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Introduction 
Under  the  CEC’s  ACTS’  programme,  the 
collaborative  R&D project  ASPeCT2 was set up 
to look  at the problems  and possible  solutions 
for  security  in  future  mobile  tele- 
communications  systems  to  follow  on  from 
GSM.  The  project  consortium  consisted  of 
Network  Operators  (Vodafone,  Panafon), 
equipment  suppliers  (Siemens  ATEA,  Siemens 
AG,  Giesecke  and  Devrient)  and  academic 
institutions  (Royal  Holloway,  University  of 
London  and  Katholieke  Universiteit  Leuven). 
While  the  greater  part  of  the  project  focused 
on  protection  of  the  communication  between 
users  -  mainly  related  to  cryptographic 
mechanisms  and  services  -  a  substantial 
section  addressed  the  problems  of  fraud  and 
abuse  of  the  networks,  looking  at  possible 
tools  for  detection  and  management,  but  also 
examining  the legal  implications. 
We  are  concerned  here  with  fraud-related 
work  and  report  on  the  viability  of  the  tools 
implemented  and give an overview  of some  of 
the legal  findings. 
and  in  the  future  UMTS  system  make  these 
networks  less  vulnerable  to  fraud. 
Nevertheless,  certain  types  of  commercial 
fraud  are  very  hard  to preclude  by  technical 
means.  Some  examples  of these  types  of fraud 
are  described  below.  The  use  of sophisticated 
fraud  detection  techniques  can  assist  in early 
detection  and  help  reduce  the  effectiveness  of 
technical  frauds. 
It  is  probably  true  that  it  is  impossible  to 
totally  eliminate  fraud.  The  fraudster  will 
always  seek  a way  to beat  the system  and  any 
fraud  detection  mechanism  has  to  be  cost- 
effective.  Figure  1  shows  the  relationship 
between  the  cost  of  fraud  and 
countermeasures  versus  the  performance  of 
the  fraud  detection  tool.  As  efforts  are 
increased  to  counter  fraud,  the  cost  of 
countermeasures  becomes  increasingly 
expensive  to  the  point  where  they  cost  the 
company  more  than  the remaining  fraud.  The 
thicker  Total  Cost  Curve  shows  the  two 
graphs  summed  to indicate  an optimum,  most 
cost-effective  level. 
The  power  of Neural  Networks  (NN)  as tools 
for  discrimination,  recognition  and 
It is estimated  that  the mobile  communication 
industry  loses many  millions  of Euros  per year 
to fraud,  so prevention  and  early  detection  of 
fraudulent  activity  is  an  important  goal  for 
network  operators.  It  is  clear  that  the 
additional  security  measures  taken  in  GSM 
I Advanced  Communications,  Technologies  and 
Services  (DG  XIII/B). 
2  Advanced  Security  for  Personal  Communications 
Technologies  -  completed  31 January  1999. 
cost  01 
Countermeasure 
; 
1  ;,::---:_:::I_  ~.~__  ___z; 
Reactwe  opnfdurd  PrOaCbVe  EFFORT 
_____.-~___---~-- 
Figure  1. Cost Analysis  of anti-Fraud  Measures 
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classification  is  well  known,  therefore,  this 
seems  a  natural  technique  to  apply  to  the 
problem  of  detecting  and  identifying 
fraudulent  activity  The  technique  is based  on 
the  fact  that  attempts  at fraud  or other  abuse 
of the network’s  services  by  a user  are always 
going  to  display  some  significant  change  of 
behaviour  from  previous  legitimate  activity. 
The recognition,  and possibly  classification,  of 
such  change  is  the  challenge  the  project  set 
itself. 
Fraud  Scenarios 
Many  new  frauds  have  appeared  since  the 
project  began  in  late  1995.  Much  of  this  has 
been  due  to  the  introduction  of pre-payment 
schemes.  We  outline  a few  more  important 
scenarios  below,  and  list  some  of  the  others. 
Non  pre-payment  fraud  includes  the 
following: 
Subscription  Fraud 
This  is  by  far  the  most  common  fraud 
encountered  on  the  GSM  network.  A person 
uses  false  identification  to  obtain  a  service. 
Subscription  fraud  can  be  further  subdivided 
into  two  categories.  The  first  is  for  personal 
usage  by  the  fraudster,  or someone  he  passes 
the phone  on  to. The  second  is for  real profit; 
here  the  fraudster  claims  to  be  a  small 
business  to  obtain  a number  of  handsets  for 
Direct Call Selling purposes.  The fraudster, who 
has  no  intention  of paying  his  bill,  now  sells- 
on  the  airtime,  probably  for  cash,  to  people 
wishing  to make  cheap  long  distance  calls. 
PABX  Fraud 
Many  companies  provide  a  dial-on  service 
through  their  PABX  system  so that  authorized 
employees  can  use  it  for  international 
purposes  from  wherever  they  may  be located. 
This  service  is  open  to  abuse  if  a fraudster 
obtains  a  password  for  such  a  system. 
Fraudsters  often  try  to  guess  these  PABX 
passwords  by  making  many  short  duration 
back-to-back  calls.  These  calls  tend  to  occur 
out  of  office  hours  and  are  to  fixed  landline 
numbers. 
Freephone  Fraud 
This  occurs  when  a person  uses  a calling  card 
service  to  dial  onwards.  In  some  countries, 
this  is illegal  in itself.  More  often  though,  it is 
the  fact  that  these  services  tend  to  attract 
fraudulent  mobiles.The  fingerprint  of  such 
activity  tends  to be back-to-back  calls and long 
duration  calls. 
Premium  Rate  Fraud 
This  involves  the  abuse  of  the  premium  rate 
services  and  can  occur  in  different  ways.  For 
example,  a person  could  set  up  a premium 
rate line with a national  operator.  The operator 
is  obliged  to  pay  the  owner  of  the  line  a 
proportion  of  the  revenue  generated.  The 
fraudster  then uses a fraudulent  mobile  to dial 
this number  for long  periods.  He may  also get 
other  people  to  do  the  same.  The  fraudster 
then  pockets  the  revenue  without  paying  for 
his  own  calls.  A  further  way  in  which 
premium  rate  services  can  be  abused  is  by 
setting  up  a fraudulent  mobile  to divert  calls 
to a popular  premium  rate line. The caller then 
only  pays  normal  rates  whilst  the  fraudulent 
mobile  picks  up  the  tab  at  the  premium  rate. 
Characteristics  are  again  long  back-to-back 
calls. 
Handset  Theft 
With many  subscribers  using  their phone  only 
intermittently  or  for  emergencies,  a  stolen 
phone  may  go  unnoticed  whilst  heavy 
fraudulent  usage  occurs. 
Roaming  Fraud 
This  is  when  a fraudster  makes  use  of  the 
delays  in  the  transfer  of  Toll Tickets  through 
Information  Security  Technical  Report,  Vol. 4,  No. 1  17 Detection  of Fraud in Mobile Telecommunications 
roaming  on  a  foreign  network  or  through 
using  a  foreign  SIM  on,  for  example,  a UK 
network.  (technically,  the  latter  should  be 
called  ‘visitor  fraud’).  Weekend  usage 
presented  a very  reliable  delay  in  the  past. 
Such  delays  are  fortunately  being  reduced  by 
modern  billing  systems. 
Other  scenarios  include  fax-back  and 
malicious  call-back  fraud,  technical  internal 
fraud,  mobile  to mobile  fraud,  tumbling  fraud, 
and  hijacking.  More  information  on these  and 
other  aspects  of  this  fraud  may  be  found  on 
the project’s  Web site’. 
In  addition,  a new  family  of  scenarios  has 
grown  around  pre-payment  -  which  in itself 
was  meant  as  a  counter  to  some  of  the 
situations  above.  Due  to  the  infancy  of  this 
technology  there  are a number  of obvious  and 
not  so  obvious  loopholes  that  enable 
fraudsters  to  make  money.  This  mainly 
revolves  around  the voucher  scheme  whereby 
a person  walks  into  a shop  and  purchases  air- 
time  via  a  physical  voucher.  The  voucher 
contains  a code  number  that  when  entered 
into  the  phone  enables  calls  to be  made;  our 
fraudster  is  in  business  again.  Identified 
instances  include  cheque  fraud,  credit  card 
fraud,  voucher  theft,  voucher  ID  duplication, 
faulty  vouchers,  network  access  fraud, 
network  attack,  long  duration  calls,  handset 
theft,  and roaming  fraud. 
The  Fraud  Detection  Environment 
There  are  three  main  roles  that  need  to  be 
considered  in  the  Fraud  Detection 
Environment.  The  first  is the  User,  the  entity 
that  makes  calls  on the network.  The User  has 
a  contractual  relationship  with  the  second 
entity,  the  Service  Provider  (SP),  who  charges 
the User  for the calls  made.  The  third  entity  is 
the  Network  Operator  (NO),  who  sells  blocks 
of air-time  to the SF’ for selling  on to the User. 
’ http:/  /www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/cosic/cosic.html 
There  is  no  direct  contract  between  the  NO 
and the User. 
The  purpose  of  a fraud  detection  system,  or 
more  specifically  the  Fraud  Detection  Tool 
(FDT)  is  to  detect  fraudulent  behaviour  of 
Users  from  their  usage  data,  before  the cost  of 
such  activity  becomes  too  great.  To achieve 
this,  it is clear  that  the  tool  should  be  placed 
where  it can receive  this usage  data  as quickly 
as  possible.  This  means  that  the  FDT  should 
optimally  be closely  connected  to the network. 
Within  the  network,  there  are  two  possible 
sources  of usage  data that can be employed  for 
fraud  detection.  The  first  source  is  the  Toll 
Tickets  (or Call  Detail  Records  -  CDRs),  the 
records  of  the  calls  produced  for  billing 
purposes,  generally  constructed  immediately 
the  call has  finished.  The  second  source  is the 
Signalling  Data produced  in the network. 
The advantage  of using  Signalling  Data  is that 
it  makes  more  usage  information  available. 
For example,  the  location  of the User  at every 
Location  Update  would  be  available,  as well 
as  the  opportunity  to monitor  the  set-up  of  a 
call when  it happens,  rather  than only once the 
call  is finished.  However,  the  disadvantage  is 
the sheer  volume  of output,  one or two  orders 
of  magnitude  greater  than  that  produced  for 
billing,  which  would  make  impossible 
filtering  and  processing  demands  on  our 
monitoring  system. 
The advantage  of using  the Toll Tickets  (TTs) is 
that  the  information  that  is  produced  for 
billing  also  contains  the  usage  behaviour 
information  valuable  for  Fraud  Detection. 
However,  billing  data  needs  to  be  gathered 
securely,  and  not  necessarily  quickly,  so  data 
may  be  a  day  old  before  it  is  processed.  To 
allow  for  hot  billing,  where  bills  can  be 
created  very  rapidly,  and  also  to  minimize 
this  fraud  risk  window,  a mediation  device 
may  be  included  in  the  network  that  polls 
the  switches  for  their  TTs  on  a regular  basis. 
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The  data  thus  collected  can  be  considered  to 
be  near  real-time,  as  the  difference  between 
real-time  delivery  and  polled  retrieval  can  be 
made  as small  as practicable. 
Once  the TTs are processed,  action  needs  to be 
taken  in response  to any alarms  that are raised 
by  the  FDT.  Such  responses  could  be  to 
question  the  Users  to  see  if  the  activity  had 
some  benign  rationale.  However,  there  is  a 
problem:  there  is  no  direct  contract  between 
the User  and the No,  so the alarms  need  to be 
distributed  to the  relevant  SPs,  who  will  take 
appropriate  action. 
System Requirements 
Performance 
To minimize  fraud  losses,  it is important  that 
the  FDT  operate  as  close  to  real-time  as 
possible.  Using  a mediation  device  to provide 
such  a feed  has  another  consequence,  that  of 
smoothing  processing  requirements. 
However,  the  usage  of  the  Network  varies 
throughout  the  day, and  there  will  be  a ‘busy 
hour’  in  the  day  which  may  contains  15% 
of  the  day’s  traffic.  The  system  will  need 
to  process  tickets  at  a rate  in  line  with  this 
value. 
Customization 
The  FDT  must  be  easily  tuneable  for 
customization  of  fraud  detection  sensitivity 
and for alarm  filtering. 
Scalability  and  Flexibility 
The  FDT  must  be  scaleable  and  adaptable  in 
the  fast  growing  mobile  network 
environment.  That  would  mean  that  any 
thresholds  set  during  the  initialization  period 
4 The  organization  of  the  Network  Operator  is  now 
tending  to have  Service  Supplier  operations. 
should  not  reduce  because  of  the  network 
expansion.  The  FDT  must  also  be  flexible 
towards  new  and  changing  fraud  methods 
and  characteristics  (i.e.  behaviour  changes) 
that are expected  to manifest  themselves  in the 
future. 
ASPeCT Choice  of Technology 
The ASPeCT  tool  did not  set  out  to provide  a 
flexible  interface,  strong  database 
technologies,  user  friendliness  and  case 
management,  which  marketable  products 
have,  but  in  the  later  stages  of  the  project  a 
number  of  these  issues  were  tackled.  The 
effort  required  to  bring  ASPeCT-based 
products  to market  is not enormous. 
There are currently  over 30 fraud  management 
products  on  the  marketplace.  Few  appear  to 
have  performed  a rigorous  examination  of the 
artificial  intelligence  technologies  that  could 
be applied  to reducing  fraud.  ASPeCT  carried 
out  a  thorough  survey  of  options  and 
possibilities  in this area. 
From  our  analysis,  it  was  clear  that  a Rule- 
Based  tool is a vital  component  of the  tool-kit 
for identifying  certain  frauds.  It is a white  box 
approach  and  hence  the  management  system 
can be given  a reason  why  the tool has flagged 
an  alarm  for  a particular  user  -  essential  for 
the  legalities  of  barring  the  user  from  the 
network. 
However,  a Rule-Based  tool  on  its own  is not 
sufficient  to  deal  with  the  complexities  and 
intricacies  of  mobile  telecoms  fraud.  Some 
form  of  ‘fuzzy’  soft-computing  technique  is 
required  to  handle  scenarios  that  cannot  be 
precisely  specified  by rules  (a situation  that  is 
prevalent  in  mobile  fraud,  but  perhaps  less 
common  in  other  fraud  detection  areas,  such 
as credit  cards).  Neural  Networks  provide  just 
this  sort  of  technology  which  is  able  to  deal 
with  novel  or abnormal  instances  or scenarios. 
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Figure  2. Screenshot  of the graphical  user interface  of the integratedfvaud  detection  system 
Four  discrete  FDT  components  were  ?? An  unsupervized  learning  tool  utilizing 
developed  by the project:  neural  networks  looking  at B-number  (call  _  _ 
A rule-based  tool; 
recipient)  data  in the toli tickets. 
A  neural  network-based  tool  using 
supervized  learning; 
The four component  tools were integrated  into 
a single  system  FDT  which  we  called  Brutus’. 
We  also  built  a  graphical  user  interface 
An  unsupervized  learning  tool  utilizing 
neural  networks  looking  at A-number  (call 
originator)  data  in the toll tickets; 
’ The  original  rationale  for  the  Brutus  acronym  has 
been  mislaid,  but  it seemed  a nice  name  to keep  for the 
GUI  guard-dog. 
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illustrated  in  Figure  2,  which  displays  the 
monitoring  information  and  alarms,  and 
provides  management  of  the  rules  and 
parameters  of the system. 
User  Profiling 
The  fraud  detection  tool  uses  a  completely 
data-driven  approach.  All  the  information 
gathered  by  the  tool  comes  only  from  the 
individual  user-specific  toll  tickets.  A method 
must  be  found  to  profile  each  user  and  to 
extract  relevant  information  from  the  Toll 
Ticket  to  try  to  detect  any  fraudulent  use.  It 
should  be  noted  that  no  geographical 
information  was  used;  this  could  be  used  to 
further  strengthen  the system  at a later  stage. 
Absolute  or  Differential  Analysis 
Toll Tickets  are data  records  containing  details 
of  each  mobile  phone  call  attempt  that  is 
made.  Toll  Tickets  are  transmitted  to  the 
network  operator  by  the  cells  or switches  that 
the mobile  phone  was  communicating  with  at 
the time. 
In  addition  to  providing  necessary  billing 
information,  Toll  Tickets  contain  additional 
information  that  can  be  used  to  identify  a 
fraudster.  Existing  fraud  detection  systems 
tend  to  interrogate  sequences  of  Toll  Tickets 
comparing  a function  of  the  various  fields 
with fixed  criteria  known  as triggers.  A trigger, 
if  activated,  raises  an  alert  status  that 
cumulatively  would  lead  to  an  investigation 
by  the  network  operator.  Such  fixed  trigger 
systems  perform  what  is known  as an absolute 
analysis  of the Toll Tickets  and are proficient  at 
detecting  the extremes  of fraudulent  activity. 
Another  approach  to  the  problem  is  to 
perform  a  differential  analysis.  Here, 
behavioural  patterns  of the  mobile  phone  are 
monitored  by  comparing  its  most  recent 
activities  with  a history  of  its  usage.  Criteria 
can  then  be  derived  to use  as triggers  that  are 
activated  when  the  usage  pattern  of a mobile 
phone  changes  significantly  over  a  short 
period  of  time.  A change  in  the  behaviour 
pattern  of  a  mobile  phone  is  a  common 
characteristic  in  nearly  all  fraud  scenarios 
excluding  those  committed  on  initial 
subscription  where  there  is  no  behavioural 
pattern  established. 
There  are  many  advantages  to  performing  a 
differential  analysis  through  profiling  the 
behaviour  of  a  user.  Firstly,  certain 
behavioural  patterns  may  be  considered 
anomalous  for  one  type  of  user,  and  hence 
potentially  indicative  of  fraud,  but  would  be 
considered  acceptable  for  another.  With  a 
differential  analysis,  flexible  criteria  can  be 
developed  that  detect  any  change  in  usage 
based  on  a  detailed  history  profile  of  user 
behaviour.  This  takes  fraud  detection  down  to 
the  personal  level  comparing  like  with  like, 
enabling  detection  of less  obvious  frauds  that 
may  only  be  noticed  at  the  personal  usage 
level.  An  absolute  usage  system  would  not 
detect  fraud  at this  level.  In addition,  because 
a typical  user is not a fraudster,  the majority  of 
criteria  that would  have  triggered  an alarm  in 
an  absolute  usage  system  will  be  seen  as  a 
large  change  in  behaviour  in  a  differential 
usage  system.  In  this  way,  a  differential 
analysis  can  be  seen  as  incorporating  the 
absolute  approach. 
The  Differential  Approach 
Most  fraud  indicators  do not become  apparent 
from  an  individual  Toll  Ticket.  With  the 
possible  exception  of  a  velocity  trap, 
confidence  can  only  be  gained  in  detecting  a 
real  fraud  through  investigating  a fairly  long 
sequence  of  Toll  Tickets.  This  is particularly 
the  case  when  considering  more  subtle 
changes  in a user’s  behaviour  by performing  a 
differential  analysis.  All  the  tools  adopt  an 
approach  based  on  analysis  of  user  profiles 
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based  on  comparison  of  recent  and  longer- 
term  behaviour  histories  derived  from  the toll 
ticket  data. 
A  differential  usage  system  requires 
information  concerning  the  user’s  history  of 
behaviour  plus  a more  recent  sample  of  the 
mobile  phones  activities.  An  initial  approach 
might  be  to  extract  and  encode  information 
from  Toll  Tickets  and  to  store  it  in  record 
format.  This  would  require  two  windows  or 
spans  over  the  sequence  of  transactions  for 
each  user.  The  shorter  sequence  is called  the 
Current  User  Profile  (CUP)  and  the  longer 
sequence,  the User  Profile  History  (UPH). 
Both  profiles  could  be treated  and maintained 
as  finite  length  queues.  When  a new  Toll 
Ticket  arrives  for a given  user, the oldest  entry 
from  the  UPH  would  be  discarded  and  the 
oldest  entry  from  the CUP  would  move  to the 
back  of  the  UPH  queue.  The  new  record 
encoded  from  the  incoming  Toll Ticket  would 
then join  the back  of the CUP queue.  Clearly,  it 
is not optimal  to search  and  retrieve  historical 
information  concerning  a  user’s  activities 
prior  to each  calculation,  on  receipt  of  a new 
Toll  Ticket.  A more  suitable  approach  is  to 
compute  a  single  cumulative  CUP  and  UPH 
for  each  user,  from  incoming  Toll Tickets  that 
can  be  stored  as  individual  records  in  a 
database.  To maintain  the  concept  of  having 
two  different  spans  over  the  Toll  Tickets 
without  retaining  a database  record  for  each 
Toll  Ticket,  both  profiles  need  to be  decayed 
before  the influence  of a new Toll Ticket  can be 
taken  into  consideration.  A profile  for  each 
user  can  then  be  represented  as  a probability 
distribution  by  normalising  the  data  in  the 
profile.  As  well  as  being  a  very  natural 
approach  for  the  NN  components,  user 
profiling  helps  the  rule-based  component  to 
overcome  its  most  criticized  drawback,  the 
inflexibility  of  one  set  of  rules  applied  to  all 
users;  user  profiles  allow  a far  more  flexible, 
user-specific  treatment. 
The  neural  network-based  tools  use  only 
differential  analysis;  the  rule-based  tool  also 
allows  absolute  analysis  against  fixed  criteria. 
The FDT Components 
The  Rule-Based Tool 
The  rule-based  tool  must  be  initialized  with 
manually  set  parameters  -  the  rules.  It  can 
work  in  two  ways:  examining  the  toll  ticket 
data against  fixed criteria  (absolute  mode)  and 
examining  them  against  variations  from 
previous  observations  (differential  mode). 
Neural Network-Based  Tool Using 
Supervised  Learning 
The  Supervised  learning  tool  needs  to  be 
educated  to  set  up  the  appropriate 
configuration  of  neurons  and  controlling 
parameters.  Before  exposure  to  the  data  for 
investigation,  the  system  is  provided  with 
training  data  to initialise  the system,  and  then 
fed  validation  data  to confirm  the  correctness 
of  the  set-up.  The  system  is  now  ready  to 
process  the operational  toll tickets. 
Unsupervised  Learning Tool Utilising  Neural 
Networks 
An  unsupervised  Neural  Network  is used  to 
look  at how  a user’s  behaviour  changes  over 
time,  and  needs  no prior  knowledge  of fraud, 
unlike  the  previous  two  tools.  There  are  two 
Unsupervised  Neural  Networks  used  in 
Brutus.  An A-Number  analysis,  which  detects 
changes  in the user’s  behaviour  on the phone, 
and  an  international  B-Number  analysis, 
which  looks  at  specific  changes  in behaviour 
of a user making  international  calls. 
Brutus 
These  four  AI  tools  are integrated  together  to 
form  the  complete  ASPeCT  Fraud  Detection 
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Tool  -  Brutus  as  in  Figure  3.  Each  tool  can 
detect  separately  suspicious  looking  or 
unusual  behaviour  and  raise  an  alarm 
appropriately.  A  GUI  has  also  been 
implemented  for  easy  user  management.  For 
the  prototype  system  it  is  run  via  a  Web 
browser.  The GUI can keep  track  of suspicious 
users  and  allows  the  operator  to  look  at  a 
specific  user’s  calls  to  give  the  final  decision 
whether  they  should  be  subject  to  further 
action. 
L 
Monitoring tool 
-  Human  Operator 
Figure  3. Brutus  architecture  schematic 
The  system  operates  by  cascading  the  input 
data  stream  through  the sequence  of tools: 
?? The  Unsupervised  NNs  -  very  good  for 
novelty  detection;  good negative  predictive 
value,  which  means  that they can eliminate 
those  users  very  easily  for  which  certainly 
nothing  is  untoward,  therefore  used  as  a 
first  filter  to  all  incoming  calls;  a further 
reason  for  putting  these  modules  high  up 
in  the  chain  is  that  their  profiling  could 
possibly  also  be  used  as  input  to  the 
Supervised  NN.  Two  unsupervised  NNs 
are deployed: 
B-number  analysis:  adding  information 
on  the  destination  of international  calls 
will  boost  the  already  reported 
performance  capability  of  the 
individual  tools; this module  comes  first 
because  it adds  information  to the  data- 
stream  that  could  easily  be  used  by  all 
three  subsequent  tools. 
?? A-number  analysis: carries out the general 
surveillance  of toll tickets  for significant 
fluctuations  in  user  behaviour;  as  there 
is no training  or rule set-up,  this tool can 
also  recognise  genuinely  novel  activity, 
possibly  characteristic  of  a new  type  or 
variant  of attack. 
The  Supervised  NN  - efficiently  pinpoints 
users  whose  behaviour  is  similar  to 
previously  observed  and  recorded 
fraudulent  behaviour;  its  training 
routines  can  be  tuned  to  bias  the 
performance  towards  a  high  positive 
predictive  value,  i.e.  when  it  puts  a 
fraudulent  label  on  a user,  the  subsequent 
modules  and/or  human  operator  can  be 
confident  that  there  really  is something  of 
concern. 
The  Rule  Based  system  -  a  good 
explanation  for  why  alarms  have  been 
raised;  it could,  for  example,  be  extended 
with  extra  rules  to  investigate  why 
previous  modules  had  raised  an  alarm;  in 
this  fashion,  new  fraud  scenarios  can 
possibly  be identified;  it can also be used  to 
define  hyper-rules  based  on  alarms  raised 
by  other  tools  and  not  only  on  its  own 
profiling/information. 
The  outline  operation  of the  integrated  tool  is 
shown  in Figure  4. Outputs  are passed  via the 
database  and  monitoring  evaluation  unit  to 
the  monitoring  tool which  displays  its alarms 
to the human  operator. 
The  ASPeCT  Trial 
One  of the difficulties  of running  a convincing 
user-trial  of  our  prototype  system  was 
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Toll Ticket File  ,  each  FDT  i 
attributes  TTs  with 
Operator  / 
Administrator 
Rule-based  Tool 
‘I”I  with  attributes:  ATT  = 
I 
Trash  \  ATTs  of a 
Fipue  4. Monitoring  within  the Integrated  Fraud  System 
obtaining  sufficient  toll ticket  data.  Great  care 
had  to  be  taken  by  network  operators  in 
sanitizing  all  data  passed  to  us  in  order  to 
safeguard  the  complete  anonymity  of the  call 
records  while  ensuring  that  any  feedback 
provided  to the operators  would  be of use. 
The  data  used  in the  trial  are GSM  toll tickets 
in  an  ASPeCT-specific  subset  of  the  archived 
Eurobill  format.  This  particular  format 
contains  25  fields,  among  which  the  ASPeCT 
tools  can  isolate  the  particularly  important 
ones  for  fraud  detection:  A-  and  B-numbers 
(call  originator  and  call  recipient  subscriber 
numbers),  the  call  starting  time,  the  duration 
of the call. 
We  obtained  a  set  of  data  containing 
approximately  four  months  worth  of  toll 
tickets  for  approximately  20  000  users.  The 
users  were  chosen  as a series  of charged-imsi 
groupings  to capture  an  expected  wide  range 
of behaviour  within  the  data.  The  toll  tickets 
were  collected  and  stored  on  a daily  basis. 
Once  collected,  they  were  merged  into 
approximately  100  files  for  distribution, 
training  and  processing.  From  this  data  it 
would  also  be  possible  to  select  a  smaller 
subset  of the users  to further  reduce  the size of 
the data  set. 
All  subscriber  information  contained  in  the 
respective  toll  ticket  fields,  and  also  all 
information  that  allows  distinction  between 
individual  users,  was  encrypted  whilst 
preserving  the  25-field  format.  Thus,  the 
confidentiality  of personal  data  was  protected 
while  the case individuality  was retajned.  Any 
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suspicious  users  that  were  identified  could  be 
investigated  by the operators  by reversing  the 
sanitization  process. 
The  trial  system  was  that  shown  in  Figure  3 
and Figure  4. 
A billing  mediator  was  simulated  to  give  the 
effect  of  the  near-real-time  arrival  of  toll 
tickets  collected  from  all operators. 
User  profiles  must  be  swapped  between  disk 
and  main  memory  each  time  a new  toll ticket 
arrived  at  the  fraud  detection  tool.  The 
performance  requirements  were  severe,  as 
peak  performance  must  exceed  30  toll  tickets 
per second.  We obtained  such  performance  by 
using  a simple,  but  optimized  database  tool 
called  GDBM.  The database  was  accessed  by a 
key,  which  was  the  IMSI  of  the  user  and 
provided  a  content  which  was  the 
concatenation  of the  Current  User  Profile  and 
User  Profile  History. 
Combination  of the Different Tools 
The  common  alarm  level  Ao,  = f  (w,,  w,,  w,, 
A,,  A,,  A,)  was  used  for  the  ordering.  The 
function  f  was  used  for  combining  the 
thresholds  computed  by all tools  to a common 
alarm  level.  The  weights  wi allowed  users 
manually  to  adjust  the  influence  of  each  tool 
on  the  common  result.  One  of the  main  tasks 
of  the  trial  was  to  determine  a well-suited 
function  on combining  the results. 
We  opted  for  a well-known  approach  from 
statistical  theory:  logistic  regression 
modelling.  The  combination  function  had 
the  form  f  =  l/(l+exp  (-Z  w,A,)).  The 
advantages  of this  combination  function  were 
as follows: 
The  determination  of  the  parameters  wi was 
straightforward.  The  necessary  optimization 
could  be based  fully  on the  individual  results 
of  the  different  tools  (B-number  analysis, 
unsupervised  neural  network,  supervised 
neural  network,  and  rule-based  system)  on  a 
training-set  similar  to  the  one  used  in  the 
development  of  the  supervised  neural 
network. 
The  number  of  parameters  that  had  to  be 
estimated  was  low  and  the  optimization 
procedure  was  guaranteed  to  converge  to  an 
optimal  solution. 
The  resulting  parameters  wi  were  also 
statistically  meaningful  in  that  contributions 
with  large  parameter  values  contributed 
exponentially  more  to the probability  of fraud 
than  contributions  with  low parameter  values. 
This  interpretation  means  that  our  integrated 
tool  is building  an  estimate  of the  probability 
of fraud  on the basis  of the behaviour  of a user. 
This  logistic  regression  modelling  provides  a 
start  estimate  of the  relative  weighting  of  the 
individual  tools. Adjusting  the weights  during 
the  daily  operation  of  the  fraud  detection 
engine  would  be  a task  for  an  administrator. 
The  same  holds  for  changing  the  thresholds 
for  a  minimum  suspicion.  An  adjustable 
global  threshold  To,  would  allow  the  raising 
of an alarm,  if Ao,  exceeds  To,.  This  is meant 
for  the  critical  cases  where  the  tool  should 
alert  an  operator  and  in  a  later  stage, 
proactively  propose  countermeasures.  In  our 
software  implementation  of  the  fraud 
detection  tool, the operator  used  a simple  Web 
browser  interface  to  adapt  these  weights 
manually. 
From  the  three  million  or  so  toll  tickets 
processed,  27  possible  fraudsters  were 
identified.  Further  analysis  was  able  to  clear 
all  but  four  of  these  from  operational  data 
(mainly hire phones,  changes  of SIM -  identity 
module  -  in  the  phone,  and  unbarring  of 
international  calling).The  remaining  four were 
to be pursued  by the operators. 
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This performance  was  seen  as encouraging  by 
the  operators.  The  ratio  of  false-positives  to 
true-positives  was  good.  Given  the  greatly 
reduced  incidence  of  fraud  resulting  from 
GSM,  the  tool  would  be  effective 
in  identifying  a  significant  portion  of  the 
abuse. 
Legal considerations 
An extensive  report  was  written  in the context 
of  the  ASPeCT-project.  Its  objective  was  the 
determination  of  the  legal  rules  applying  in 
the various  fields  of law affected  by the use  of 
fraud  detection  systems  by  mobile 
communications  operators  or  service 
providers. 
Mobile  telecommunications  operators  use  call 
data  records  for  fraud  detection  purposes. 
They  contain  details  relating  to  every  mobile 
phone  call attempt.  Toll tickets  are transmitted 
to  the  network  operator  by  the  cells  or 
switches  that  the  mobile  phone  was 
communicating  with.  The  tickets  are  used  to 
determine  the  charge  to  the  subscriber,  but 
they  also provide  information  about  customer 
usage,  and  thus  facilitate  the  detection  of any 
possible  fraudulent  use. 
We examined  four  legal  questions  with  regard 
to the use of fraud  detection  systems: 
?? Do  operators  monitoring  calls  on  the 
network  for  fraud  detection  purposes,  act 
against  the  fundamental  principle  of  the 
confidentiality  of  private  telecomm- 
unications?  The  confidential  character  is 
not  limited  to  the  content  of  the  calls  but 
extended  to all kinds  of data with  regard  to 
the call, such  as the identity  and location  of 
the  calling  and  the  called  parties,  the  time 
and the duration  of the call, etc. 
?? Are operators  processing  call’data  for fraud 
detection  purposes,  controllers  of  the 
processing  of  personal  data  in  the  legal 
sense?  If  so, what  are  the  consequences  of 
the  application  of personal  data  protection 
rules?  Which  law  will  be  applicable  to the 
processing  of  call  data,  when  more  than 
one country  is involved,  as is often  the case 
in the context  of mobile  communicationsJ’? 
?? Given  the  fact  that  the  results  of  the  fraud 
detection  system  are  always  computer- 
readable  data,  how  should  this  data  be 
presented  as  evidence  in  court?  Will  the 
courts  in the  EU  Member  States  accept  the 
data  resulting  from  fraud  detection 
systems  as admissible  evidence? 
?? If  the  data  resulting  from  the  fraud 
detection  system  are  accepted  and  there  is 
no  doubt  that  fraud  has  been  committed, 
how  will  the  different  fraud  types 
identified  in mobile  telecommunications  be 
legally  qualified?  Is  telecommunications 
fraud  considered  as a specific  type  of crime 
or do we have  to use general  qualifications 
such  as theft? 
Each  of  these  questions  were  dealt  with  in  a 
separate  chapter  of the full report;. 
As  far  as  the  issue  of  telecommunications 
privacy  is concerned,  there  seem  to  be  three 
types  of national  legislation  with  regard  to the 
possibility  for  network  operators  or  service 
providers  to process  call data  concerning  their 
subscribers. 
A first  type  of  legislation  does  not  explicitly 
grant  an  exception  to  network  operators  or 
h  This  is particularly  difficult  to resolve:  consider  user  a 
subscribing  to  network  in  country  A  travelling 
(roaming)  in  country  X  calling  user  b  subscribing  to 
network  in country  B travelling  (roaming)  in country  Y 
- who  has  legal  jurisdiction? 
i ASPeCT  Deliverable  D25  -  WP2.6:  Legal  Issues  - 
Final  Report  (to  be  available  on  http:/  /www.esat. 
kuleuven.ac.be/cosic/cosic.html). 
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service  providers  to  process  call  data  but 
accepts  such practices  implicitly. 
A second  type  of  legislation  explicitly  grants 
an  exception  to network  operators  to register 
call  data  as  far  as  this  is  necessary  for  the 
proper  functioning  of  the  network  or 
the  provision  of  the  telecommunications 
service. 
A third  type  of legislation  explicitly  grants  an 
exception  to  network  operators  or  service 
providers  to  register  call  data  for  fraud 
detection  purposes  but  may  submit  this 
exception  to specific  conditions. 
It  is evident  that  the  data  protection  laws  of 
the  EU  Member  States,  enacted  over  a period 
of more  than  20 years,  contain  a wide  variety 
of  solutions,  which  is the  precise  reason  why 
the  European  Commission  took  the  initiative 
to  propose  a  Directive  in  this  field.  This 
Directive  (95/46/EC)  -  was  enacted  on  24 
October  1995.  All  Member  States  of  the  EU 
were  required  to  transpose  the  provisions  of 
this  Directive  into  their  national  law  by  24 
October  1998 at the latest. 
At  this  time,  all  the  Member  States  are 
changing  their  data  protection  law  in order  to 
make  it compatible  with  the  provisions  of the 
European  Directive. 
An  essential  principle  of  the  European  data 
protection  Directive  is  the  so-called  finality 
principle  stating  that  personal  data  collected 
for  a certain  purpose  (i.e. billing),  should  not 
be  used  for  other  -  secondary  -  purposes, 
unless  certain  conditions  have  been  fulfilled. 
One  of the conditions  is the duty  to inform  the 
data  subject  about  the secondary  use. 
The  European  data  protection  directive  also 
contains  very  specific  rules  regarding  which 
law  has  to be  applied  when  personal  data  are 
processed  in  more  than  one  Member  State. 
The  criterion  set  forward  by  the  Directive  is 
the ‘establishment  of the controller’.  Export  of 
personal  data  outside  the  European  Union  is 
forbidden  to  countries  without  an  ‘adequate 
level’  of personal  data protection. 
Electronic  data  is admissible  as evidence  in all 
the  EU Member  States.  Legislation  enacted  in 
1984  (UK)  and  1992  (Ireland)  ensure  the 
admissibility  of such  evidence  in the common 
law  jurisdictions  while  the  principle  of  free 
proof  is used  in  the  civil  law  jurisdictions  to 
guarantee  the  admissibility  of  data  as 
evidence.  In  addition,  civil  law  courts 
sometimes  have  a broad  discretion  regarding 
what  they will accept  as evidence. 
The report  also examines  the issue  of how  one 
legally  qualifies  various  types  of  mobile 
telecommunications  fraud.  Does  the  law  of 
the  EU  Member  States  contain  a  legal 
qualification  of telecommunications  fraud  as a 
specific  incrimination.  Is  there  a  specific 
criminal  treatment  of  telecommunications 
fraud.  Or  do  we  have  to  fall  back  on 
traditional  criminal  categories  such  as  theft, 
deceit,  forgery,  etc. 
The  task  of  qualifying  different  types  of 
cellular  fraud  does  not  fit  neatly  into  one 
particular  field  of  law.  In  addition  to 
qualifying  the  different  types  of  cellular 
fraud,  the  report  also  contains  the  relevant 
legislation  used  to  prosecute  cellular  fraud 
and  the  possible  legal  remedies  available  to 
counteract  mobile  fraud  in  the  relevant 
member  states. 
Conclusions 
The  project  produced  a  number  of 
achievements,  which  may  (individually  or 
collectively)  be  taken  up  commercially  to 
combat  what  will  continue  to be  a significant 
threat  to the  revenues  of the  mobile  industry, 
as  well  as  being  a  threat  to  the  operational 
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well-being  of  a  service  upon  which  we  are 
becoming  increasingly  dependent. 
Refinement  of  state-of-the-art  AI 
techniques  to address  the  specific  problem 
of fraud  detection. 
Incorporation  of  an  unsupervised 
behaviour  profiling  component. 
Successful  implementation  and 
demonstration  of  individual  tools, 
discovering  their  relative  strengths  at 
detecting  aberrant  activity  in  a 
communications  network. 
Subsequent  integration  of  the  tools  to 
combine  the  strengths  of  the  individual 
components. 
Performance  is  such  as  to  be  easily 
scaleable  to  the  online  handling  of  toll 
tickets  in near  real time. 
?? Trials  successfully  identified  a number 
of  previously  undetected  suspicious 
subscribers. 
?? Flexible  JAVA-based  GUI  and  modular 
environment  to facilitate  development  of a 
commercial  product. 
?? An  analysis  of  the  current  legal  situation 
and  constraints  which  provides  a basis  for 
future  rationalisation  of law  and  guidance 
to  current  operators  and  services 
providers. 
Interest  has been  expressed  in the commercial 
development  of  our  results  into  fraud 
detection  products.  There  is further  scope  for 
the  techniques  in  the  surveillance  and 
management  of  complex  systems,  notably 
behaviour  of communications  networks.  Even 
further  afield,  one  of  the  academics  provides 
consultancy  on  the  applicability  of  the 
techniques  we  developed  to the  processing  of 
medical  diagnostic  data. 
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